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CRAZY IN ALABAMA: JUDICIAL PROCESS AND 
THE LAST STAND AGAINST MARRIAGE 
EQUALITY IN THE LAND OF GEORGE 
WALLACE 
Howard M. Wasserman * 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 
Obergefell v. Hodges that prohibitions on same-sex marriage violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment.1 In hindsight, the decision seems inevitable, the 
culmination of a precisely two-year race towards marriage equality that 
began with the Court’s 2013 invalidation of the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act on June 26, 2013.2 Federal trial and appellate courts were almost 
uniform in declaring state bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional,3 and 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari4 or stays of judgment5 in all of those 
cases. Additionally, high-ranking public officials in several states gave up 
their opposition to marriage equality, ordering the issuance of licenses to 
same-sex couples even before all litigation had concluded.6 
Alabama represented the glaring exception. During winter and spring 
 
*  Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. Thanks to James Grimmelmann, Josh Blackman, Doug 
Laycock, Adam Steinman, and readers of PrawfsBlawg.com for comments and feedback. 
1  No. 14-556, 2015 WL 2473451 (2015) [http://perma.cc/43H2-96VP]. 
2  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) [http://perma.cc/YTV8-ZJB4]. 
3  Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) [http://perma.cc/WGF4-VZD3]; Bostic v. 
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) [http://perma.cc/MNM4-39LQ]; Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 
1193 (10th Cir. 2014) [http://perma.cc/CR5F-PAQ7]; Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (S.D. 
Ala. 2015) [http://perma.cc/QCG9-JEBG]; Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL 328728 
(S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015) [http://perma.cc/ALM6-XD4B]; Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. 
Fla. 2014) [http://perma.cc/3BC3-RKYW]. 
4  See, e.g., Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) (mem.) (case from Indiana); Walker v. Wolf, 
135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) (mem.) (case from Wisconsin); McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 (2014) (mem.) 
(case from Virginia); Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014) (mem.) (case from Oklahoma); Herbert v. 
Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014) (mem.) (case from Utah). 
5  Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015) (mem.) [http://perma.cc/N9M9-X833]. But see id. at 941 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay) (“This acquiescence may well be seen as a 
signal of the Court’s intended resolution of that question. This is not the proper way to discharge our 
Article III responsibilities. And, it is indecorous for this Court to pretend that it is.”). 
6  News Release, Attorney General Pam Biondi, Attorney General Pam Bondi’s Statement 
Regarding Judge Hinkle’s Order (Jan. 1, 2015), available at 
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/891D80F35B6D0B6985257DC0007E5358 
[http://perma.cc/2LYK-Y5YV]; Letter from Attorney General Kamala Harris to Governor Edmund G. 
Brown Jr. (June 3, 2013), available at 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ht/ag_prop_8_letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/4FVP-E7TN]. 
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2015, with Obergefell looming, Alabama state officials and the Supreme 
Court of Alabama took an increasingly firm stand against marriage equality 
and against multiple decisions of a lower federal court invalidating the 
state’s constitutional7 and statutory8 bans on same-sex marriage. For many, 
these efforts echoed in Alabama’s unfortunate civil rights history—
segregationist Governor George Wallace standing in the doorway of the 
University of Alabama to prevent admitted African-American students from 
registering;9 fire hoses, police dogs, and violence;10 systematic attempts to 
silence anti-segregation voices;11 and massive resistance to Brown and to 
integration.12 In characterizing the actions of Alabama officials as defiance 
and rebellion against the federal judiciary13 or as “reckless rejection of 
federal constitutional principles,”14 reporters, commentators, and advocates 
too easily linked the current controversy over marriage equality to old 
opposition to integration. Even those who acknowledged the procedural 
regularity of these officials’ actions nonetheless viewed procedural 
regularity as a cover for discrimination.15 It was 1963 all over again, with 
Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore playing the role of Wallace’s heir in 
bigoted defiance of the federal judiciary and disregard for the federal 
 
7  ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03 [http://perma.cc/HF5U-P6YL].  
8  Ala. Code § 30-1-19 (1975) [http://perma.cc/SCH3-NDAA]. 
9  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 437 (2004). 
10  Id. at 436–41. 
11  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [http://perma.cc/96NG-GJ6Y]; Howard M. 
Wasserman, A Jurisdictional Perspective on New York Times v. Sullivan, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 901, 909 
(2013) [http://perma.cc/9PBQ-CVW7]. 
12  KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 342. 
13  Emily Bazelon, John Dickerson, and David Plotz, The “Would You Attend a Gay Wedding?” 
Edition, SLATE POLITICAL GABFEST (Apr. 24, 2015, 11:48 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/gabfest/2015/04/political_gabfest_on_europe_s_burgeoning_im
migration_crisis_the_koch_brothers.html [http://perma.cc/KL2C-S8L5]; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Alabama’s Dangerous Defiance, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/opinion/alabamas-dangerous-defiance.html; Sandhya 
Somashekhar, Judicial Defiance in Alabama: Same-Sex Marriages Begin, But Most Counties Refuse, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/alabama-judge-stakes-out-defiant-
stance-against-same-sex-marriages/2015/02/09/a1be2de4-b06f-11e4-854b-a38d13486ba1_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/8DXQ-3V2A]; Mark Joseph Stern, Alabama Chief Justice Defies Federal Order, 
Refuses to Allow Gay Marriages, SLATE (Feb. 9, 2015, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/02/09/alabama_s_roy_moore_defies_federal_court_order_on
_gay_marriage.html [http://perma.cc/49YG-HLGC]. 
14  Ariane de Vogue, Judge Strikes Down Alabama Same-Sex Marriage Ban, But Puts Hold on 
Ruling, CNN (May 22, 2015, 6:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/21/politics/alabama-same-sex-
marriage (quoting Southern Poverty Law Center deputy legal director David Dinielli) 
[http://perma.cc/Q4QA-J338]. 
15  See Adam Lamparello, Why Chief Justice Roy Moore and the Alabama Supreme Court Just 
Made the Case For Same-Sex Marriage, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2015), available at 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=jcl_online 
[http://perma.cc/QHP2-9NWZ]; Krotoszynski, supra note 13.  
110:1 (2015) Crazy in Alabama 
 3 
Constitution.16 
But while the comparison was easy, it also was, as a matter of judicial 
process, inaccurate. 
In fact, the controversy in Alabama is significant for what it 
demonstrates about judicial procedure and the limited scope of injunctive 
relief in constitutional litigation. It reveals how judicial decisionmaking and 
judicial remedies actually function in a geographically divided and 
hierarchical federal judiciary. True, the resulting process was uncertain, 
inefficient, chaotic, and even ugly. To the extent this triggered concerns for 
“the integrity of the judicial system, which rises and falls on the public’s 
perception,”17 one might complain that this process shook public confidence 
in the system. But the appropriate response is to change the public’s 
perception and understanding of how the judicial process really operates in 
constitutional litigation and why. When George Wallace stood in the 
doorway fifty years ago, he did so in defiance of a federal court injunction 
directed at him and compelling him to refrain from interfering with the 
admission of African-American students to the University of Alabama.18 By 
contrast, Alabama’s last stand against marriage equality was about the steps 
necessary to produce that binding federal order against a proper defendant 
as to proper plaintiffs in the face of procedural reality. 
Obergefell has settled the constitutional debate over marriage equality, 
rendering the events of those several months in Alabama a historical 
footnote, a final speed bump in an inexorable move to marriage equality 
that we will remember in just that way. Nevertheless, these events illustrate 
the procedure at the heart of constitutional and civil rights enforcement and 
are therefore worth exploring in that light. And because marriage equality 
will not be the last constitutional controversy contested in the federal 
courts, judges, attorneys, the media, and the public must recognize and 
understand these procedural realities. 
 
JUDICIAL ORDERS AND LITIGATION CHAOS 
In late January 2015, Judge Callie Granade of the Southern District of 
Alabama twice held that Alabama’s same-sex marriage bans violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment—first in Searcy v. Strange,19 brought by a female 
couple married in California and seeking a second-parent adoption in 
Alabama, and second in Strawser v. Strange,20 brought by two same-sex 
 
16  Lamparello, supra note 15, at 3–4. 
17  Lamparello, supra note 16, at 3. 
18  United States v. Wallace, 218 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. Ala. 1963) [http://perma.cc/NN8K-
RZUT]. 
19  Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL 328728 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015). 
20  Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8439 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 26, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/GR9F-L365]. 
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couples seeking marriage licenses in Mobile. The sole named defendant in 
both actions was Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange. Both 
injunctions prohibited Strange from enforcing state laws banning same-sex 
marriage. The Strawser injunction further bound his “officers, agents, 
servants and employees, and others in active concert or participation with 
any of them, who would seek to enforce the marriage laws of Alabama 
which prohibit same-sex marriage,” incorporating the injunctive scope 
permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2).21 
In Alabama, however, responsibility for issuing marriage licenses rests 
with probate judges22 who are members of the judicial branch,23 although 
performing executive or administrative functions such as issuing marriage 
licenses.24 The licensing power does not rest with the state attorney general 
or with any executive branch official subject to his control. Given state 
separation of powers principles, the attorney general also lacks any 
supervisory authority over probate judges. Alabama thus presented a bizarre 
situation. The state officials empowered to issue marriage licenses to same-
sex couples were not parties to the federal litigation and not required by the 
resulting injunction to issue any licenses or to refrain from enforcing the 
marriage ban. The only state official subject to the injunction—the attorney 
general—lacked the power to issue, or order anyone else to issue, marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples. There also did not appear to be any single 
state-level official who could supervise and control the state’s probate 
judges. 
Compare this with, for example, litigation over California’s 
Proposition 8 (Prop 8). Two same-sex couples sued six executive officer 
defendants—the Governor, the state attorney general, the director and 
deputy director of the state Department of Public Health (DPH), and the 
county clerk–recorders (the officials who actually issue licenses) for two 
counties. After finding that Prop 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
district court permanently enjoined the six defendant officials from 
applying or enforcing the state marriage ban and directed them to ensure 
that all persons under their control or supervision similarly did not enforce 
the ban.25 As that injunction was ready to take effect,26 California Attorney 
General Kamala Harris advised DPH officials to notify all county clerks 
 
21  Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(B)–(C). 
22  See ALA. CONST. art. III, § 42 [http://perma.cc/682D-764K]; Ala. Code § 12-13-30 (1975) 
[http://perma.cc/M263-6XFX]. 
23  Ala. Code § 30-1-9 (1975) [http://perma.cc/5NV6-NPNN]. 
24  Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 1880605, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2015) 
(defining issuance of marriage licenses as an administrative function) [http://perma.cc/YY2S-PREM]. 
25  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
https://perma.cc/9RQR-3BJP]. 
26  The Supreme Court’s determination that initiative proponents lacked standing to appeal rendered 
the district court judgment and the injunction final. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 
(2013) [http://perma.cc/S55L-L3KY]. 
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that they were similarly subject to the injunction and should begin issuing 
marriage licenses to all couples who wanted them. Because DPH controlled 
county clerk–recorders in administering the state’s marriage license and 
certification laws,27 the injunction against the attorney general and the DPH 
officers effectively enjoined these nonparties subject to their control. And 
those high-level state officials ordered county-level officials to behave as if 
the injunction covered all requesting couples. 
Judge Granade temporarily stayed the injunctions in Searcy and 
Strawser to allow the Eleventh Circuit to consider whether a stay pending 
appeal was warranted,28 thereby leaving time for affected actors to consider 
the scope and effect of those orders. The Alabama Probate Judges 
Association advised its members not to issue licenses to same-sex couples; 
because no probate judge was subject to any federal court order, doing so 
violated the still-existing state law ban on issuing licenses to same-sex 
couples.29 Chief Justice Moore went one step further, asserting his authority 
as the chief administrative officer of the state courts to first advise against30 
and then prohibit31 probate judges from issuing licenses, emphasizing the 
limited scope of Judge Granade’s injunction, its nonapplication to probate 
judges, and the limited precedential authority of district court decisions. 
Similar confusion about the scope of a district court injunction had 
arisen in Florida earlier the same month. Judge Robert Hinkle of the 
Northern District of Florida had declared invalid that state’s same-sex 
marriage ban and had enjoined one clerk to grant a license to one couple in 
one county.32 The Florida Association of County Clerks (FACC) advised its 
members that the injunction did not compel any other clerk to issue a 
license to any other couple and recommended that nonparty clerks refrain 
from issuing licenses in violation of state law.33 Judge Hinkle responded 
 
27  Letter from Attorney General Kamala Harris to Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. (June 3, 2013), 
available at http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ht/ag_prop_8_letter.pdf. 
28  Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8439 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 26, 2015); 
Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL 328825, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/E4CF-TD48]. 
29  Michael Finch II, Alabama Probate Judges Association Says Not to Issue Marriage Licenses to 
Same-Sex Couples on Monday, AL.COM (Jan. 25, 2015, 5:58 PM), 
http://www.al.com/news/mobile/index.ssf/2015/01/alabama_probate_court_judges_gay_marriage.html 
[http://perma.cc/655V-UGGY]. 
30  Memorandum from Chief Justice Roy S. Moore to Ala. Probate Judges (Feb. 3, 2015), available 
at http://media.al.com/news_impact/other/Chief%20Justice%20Moore%27s%20memorandum.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3MY8-9B5T]. 
31  Admin. Order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Feb. 8, 2015), available at 
http://media.al.com/news_impact/other/CJ%20Moore%20Order%20to%20Ala.%20Probate%20Judges.p
df [http://perma.cc/5GA7-BCFH]. 
32  Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293 (N.D. Fla. 2014). 
33  Memorandum from Attorneys to FACC (Dec. 15, 2014), available at 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/gay-south-florida/article4531773.ece/BINARY/ 
Greenberg%20Traurig%20revised%20memo%20to%20clerks [http://perma.cc/ZCJ7-ZMC5]. 
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with an “Order on the Scope of the Preliminary Injunction,” reminding 
everyone of the historic evils of resistance to federal judicial efforts to 
vindicate constitutional rights, and insisting that, while his injunction did 
not require any nonparty clerks to issue licenses to other couples, “the 
Constitution” did.34 This worked in Florida—both the FACC35 and the 
Florida attorney general36 acceded to clerks issuing licenses without 
awaiting further lawsuits, orders, or appeals. It worked so well, in fact, that 
Judge Granade similarly “clarified” her Searcy order by block-quoting 
several paragraphs from Judge Hinkle’s order, notably the insistence that 
“the Constitution” required issuance of licenses even by nonparty officials 
to nonparty couples.37 
On Monday, February 9, the Strawser and Searcy stays expired when 
the Supreme Court of the United States (over dissent of Justice Thomas, 
joined by Justice Scalia) refused to further stay the Searcy injunction.38 
Thus did marriage equality come to Alabama, albeit haltingly—within the 
first two days, probate judges in only sixteen of the state’s sixty-seven 
counties were issuing licenses to same-sex couples.39 
Seeking to eliminate the intrastate inconsistency, the federal plaintiffs 
returned to Judge Granade. The Searcy plaintiffs moved to have Probate 
Judge Don Davis of Mobile—the judge who had refused their adoption in 
light of the state prohibition on recognizing same-sex marriages—held in 
contempt for violating the injunction. Judge Granade swiftly and correctly 
rejected the request, pointing out that Davis was not a party in Searcy, not 
subject to the injunction, and not subject to the court’s contempt power.40 
Moreover, it would have been incoherent to hold Davis in contempt for 
failing to issue licenses to nonparty couples seeking to be married when the 
applicable injunction arose in an adoption case involving a married couple. 
The Strawser plaintiffs—whose action did involve issuance of 
marriage licenses—made the more appropriate and effective move. They 
amended their complaint to add Davis as a defendant and to add two new 
couples as plaintiffs. Two days later, Judge Granade extended the 
 
34  Brenner v. Scott, No. 4:14cv107-RH/CAS, 2015 WL 44260, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 1, 2015) 
(emphasis in original) [https://perma.cc/7LHY-QCVE]. 
35  Howard Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, Redux, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 3, 2015, 
9:31 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/01/the-process-of-marriage-equality-
redux.html [http://perma.cc/HN4G-8U58]. 
36  News Release, Attorney General Pam Biondi, Attorney General Pam Bondi’s Statement 
Regarding Judge Hinkle’s Order (Jan. 1, 2015), available at 
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/891D80F35B6D0B6985257DC0007E5358. 
37  Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2015), available at 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PB-AL-0005-0008.pdf [http://perma.cc/67VW-66GZ]. 
38  See Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015) (mem.); id. at 940 (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of application for stay). 
39  Somashekhar, supra note 13. 
40  Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL 519725, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/A97M-V3B3]. 
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injunction to Davis as to all four plaintiff-couples.41 Probate judges in more 
(although still not all) counties responded to the expanded order by 
beginning to issue licenses. 
The key to understanding these moves, as well as the source of 
confusion, is the inherently limited nature of judicial decisions and judicial 
awards of injunctive relief. Even when addressing important constitutional 
and social issues such as due process, equal protection, and marriage 
equality, a court resolves only a discrete dispute between particular, 
identified parties, producing an order that controls their rights, obligations, 
and behavior as to one another, but not behavior of or towards nonparties.42 
Thus, neither of Judge Granade’s original injunctions prohibited any 
probate judge from enforcing the same-sex marriage ban or obligated any 
probate judge to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple, as none was 
a defendant or subject to the control of a defendant. Expanding the Strawser 
injunction against Judge Davis obligated only him, but no other probate 
judge, to refrain from enforcing the ban and to issue licenses. And that 
obligation extended only to the Strawser plaintiffs (four couples), but to no 
one else.43 
Along with the injunctions, Judge Granade also declared the marriage 
bans constitutionally invalid. But those declarations functioned chiefly as 
explanation and justification for her orders to the parties. The opinions 
affected the rest of the world only through their precedential force and the 
extent to which they might influence the next court in resolving a similar 
constitutional question involving different parties.44 Importantly, however, 
federal district opinions are not binding authority on any other court—state 
court, other federal districts, the same federal district, or even the same 
federal district judge in a subsequent case.45 This was another unique feature 
of Alabama’s marriage-equality controversy—the Eleventh Circuit neither 
spoke nor froze the status quo until it could speak. Thus, everything flowed 
from decisions of a single trial judge rather than the decision of a court of 
appeals, which at least would have provided binding precedent within the 
circuit. 
At best, Judge Granade’s opinion had persuasive authority; it might 
convince another court to adopt the same understanding of the Fourteenth 
 
41  Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1207–09, 1210 (S.D. Ala. 2015). 
42  Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) [http://perma.cc/RA75-W89N]; Doran v. Salem Inn, 
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) [http://perma.cc/ZDE5-89L5]; cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN 
AMERICAN REMEDIES 217 (Concise 4th ed. 2012). 
43  Cf. LAYCOCK, supra note 42, at 217. 
44  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 1321, 1340 (2000); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1328 (1996). 
45  Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011) [http://perma.cc/6FXW-6ELY]; ASARCO 
Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) [http://perma.cc/LLF2-WS2X]; Fallon, supra note 44, at 1340. 
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Amendment and to order a new defendant to issue marriage licenses to new 
plaintiffs. Her attempt to “clarify” the injunction (mimicking Judge 
Hinkle’s move in Florida) did not—and, as a matter of law, could not—
change this reality. Licenses were required by “the Constitution” only as 
interpreted by one district judge in a single judicial opinion that was not 
binding on any other court or any other case. Moreover, a public official 
cannot be in contempt of the Constitution, the district court’s declaration of 
unconstitutionality, or the district court precedent; a person only can be in 
contempt of a judicial order directed to him personally. Whatever Judge 
Granade declared that the Constitution required, it did not actually obligate 
any nonparty probate judge or clerk to follow that requirement. 
Thus, that every other Alabama official did not voluntarily comply 
with Judge Granade’s constitutional interpretation did not reflect Massive 
Resistance Redux. Probate judges who declined to issue licenses were not 
flouting the law, rebelling against the Constitution, or defying federal 
authority in not abiding by a single non-binding precedent in a case to 
which they were not party. Nor was Chief Justice Moore in advising and 
ordering probate judges that they were not obligated by the order or bound 
by the precedent. The constitutional question remained open and it was 
possible (if unlikely) that the next district judge might rule differently on 
the constitutional question in the next action. 
Of course, nothing prohibited nonparty probate judges from 
voluntarily acting in accordance with Judge Granade’s non-binding order, 
rather than forcing new parties to commence new constitutional litigation 
against them.46 In fact, judicial and political processes incentivize them to 
do so. The likely result of a new lawsuit by a new couple—especially in the 
Southern District, where any action would be assigned to Judge Granade 
under the district’s related-case rule47—was practically (albeit not legally) a 
foregone conclusion. Moreover, any probate judge who forced a lawsuit 
and was enjoined would have been liable for the plaintiffs’ reasonable 
attorney’s fees, as every couple obtaining injunctive relief compelling 
issuance of a marriage license would qualify as a “prevailing party” in a 
constitutional action.48 These incentives worked in states from California to 
Florida, where officials recognized that it was not worth the time, expense, 
or effort to force new litigation that they would lose; they began issuing 
licenses to all requesting couples, even though not judicially compelled to 
do so by an injunction that only guaranteed licenses to a few identified 
 
46  Cf. LAYCOCK, supra note 42, at 217. 
47  S.D. Ala. L.R. 3.3(a) [http://perma.cc/7YD3-DSW8]. 
48  42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) [http://perma.cc/7GQT-S78P]; Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. 
v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603–04 (2001) [http://perma.cc/AXN7-C55G]; 
see, e.g., Stipulation and Agreement as to Costs and Attorneys’ Fees at ¶¶ 10–11, Wolf v. Walker, No. 
14-CV-64, (W.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2015), available at 
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/Wisconsin%20ssm%20fee%20stipulation.pdf [http://perma.cc/9AEQ-
DH83]. 
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couples. 
One nevertheless might argue that non-acquiescence was itself an act 
of Massive Resistance to the extent it might have been motivated by animus 
towards LGBT people and by moral objections to opening the institution of 
civil marriage to them. But it is impossible to do more than speculate about 
why individual probate judges acted or failed to act in a given way. More 
importantly, it does not change the legal reality. Alabama public officials 
were under no legal obligation to issue licenses or to refrain from enforcing 
the state marriage ban other than within the limited scope of the controlling 
federal injunction. And they could wait for that injunction, issued following 
procedurally appropriate litigation, before acting in a certain way. That does 
not change even if the decision to wait may have been made with bad 
motives. 
Once that injunction came, of course, a named probate judge would 
become bound, and in continuing to refuse licenses, he would have been 
defying a federal order or rebelling against the federal courts. But that never 
seemed a real danger as to the probate judges who declined to acquiesce in 
Judge Granade’s initial decision; several indicated their intent to abide by, 
and thus their belief in the legitimacy of, any federal order that might issue 
against them in the future.49 
The distinction between a binding injunction and persuasive precedent 
marks the fundamental difference between 2015 and 1963, between the 
admittedly halting move towards marriage equality and Wallace’s stand in 
the doorway against desegregation. And it shows why the Wallace analogy, 
although rhetorically and politically powerful, remains inaccurate. 
The students seeking to enroll at the University of Alabama in June 
1963 had obtained an injunction from a federal district court ordering 
university officials to admit them.50 Additionally, the United States had 
obtained a separate injunction enjoining Wallace from interfering with 
enforcement of that first injunction.51 In standing in the doorway, therefore, 
Wallace did not merely defy principles of equality emanating from the 
Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in recent Supreme Court decisions.52 
He defied a federal court order, expressly binding on him and compelling 
him to refrain from engaging in certain conduct. Had the United States 
pursued the option, Wallace could have been held in contempt. And when 
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, U.S. Marshals, and a 
 
49  Michele Gerlach, Bowden: No Same-Sex Licenses Here, ANDALUSIASTARNEWS (Feb. 7, 2015, 
1:58 AM), http://www.andalusiastarnews.com/2015/02/07/bowden-no-same-sex-licenses-here 
[http://perma.cc/X4LN-QSJ2]. 
50  Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235, 239 (N.D. Ala. 1955) [http://perma.cc/M54U-K2FL]. 
51  United States v. Wallace, 218 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. Ala. 1963). 
52  See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) [http://perma.cc/5E3C-BFPG]; Missouri ex rel. 
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) [http://perma.cc/WA6X-B7BM]; cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954) [http://perma.cc/6RPP-8R7N]. 
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federalized National Guard ordered Wallace to stand aside, they acted as the 
Executive Branch enforcing a valid and binding judicial order, not merely 
an abstract judicial declaration that the Constitution prohibits segregation in 
public higher education. 
Neither Moore nor Wallace relied on the injunction–precedent 
distinction. In his doorway speech, Wallace never mentioned the federal 
judiciary or the federal injunction binding him at that moment; he spoke 
only of the over-grasping “Central Government” and the absence of federal 
legislation authorizing integration.53 This suggests that, in Wallace’s view, 
even an injunction could not compel him to permit integration of the 
university. Moore has been even more explicit that he and other state 
officials may ignore any mandate they regard as unlawful, including one 
issued by the Supreme Court.54 
Regardless of whether either emphasized it, however, the distinction 
remains essential and it controls any process-oriented understanding of 
marriage-equality litigation in Alabama. Whatever one may believe about 
the opinions, motivations, or morality of Moore and other state officials, it 
does not alter the fact that none of them acted unlawfully or in disregard of 
the law. None disobeyed any court order or otherwise attempted to shirk 
binding legal duties. Moore was never enjoined, nor even an active litigant 
in any federal litigation. Individual probate judges made seemingly good 
faith efforts to determine their precise obligations, weighing competing 
views from a number of sources. Once enjoined, Davis issued licenses to 
the four plaintiff-couples in Strawser without public protest. And every 
probate judge who spoke publicly indicated an intention to do the same, if 
and when enjoined. 
 
THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA ENTERS THE FRAY 
The equilibrium that emerged from those first weeks—some probate 
judges voluntarily complying, new plaintiffs initiating or expanding federal 
litigation against probate judges who did not voluntarily comply, courts 
issuing new or expanded injunctions and ordering more licenses—might 
have held until the Supreme Court decided Obergefell. 
But a new procedural wrinkle emerged in state court. In early March, 
the Supreme Court of Alabama, exercising its original jurisdiction, issued a 
 
53  Governor George C. Wallace, Statement and Proclamation at the University of Alabama (June 
11, 1963), available at http://www.archives.state.al.us/govs_list/schooldoor.html [http://perma.cc/E3JA-
6F6L]. 
54  Lamparello, supra note 16, at 3–4; Jeremy Diamond, Chief Alabama Judge Would Defy Supreme 
Court in Gay Marriage Ruling, CNN (Feb. 12, 2015, 12:40 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/12/politics/ray-moore-alabama-gay-marraige-supreme-court-slavery 
[http://perma.cc/89DH-LZE2]; Justin Snow, Roy Moore: Courts Cannot Redefine Biblical Marriage, 
METROWEEKLY (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.metroweekly.com/2015/03/roy-moore-courts-cannot-
redefine-biblical-marriage. 
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writ of mandamus prohibiting all probate judges from issuing marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.55 
State mandamus had become a common move by state officials to 
keep local officials from acquiescing in precedential decisions prior to a 
binding injunction. For example, following Tenth Circuit decisions 
invalidating marriage bans in Utah and Oklahoma, state officials in Kansas 
(also located in the Tenth Circuit) obtained a temporary stay from the state 
supreme court prohibiting county officials from issuing licenses,56 at least 
until a federal court applied circuit precedent to hold that Kansas’s marriage 
ban was similarly constitutionally defective and to enjoin its enforcement.57 
South Carolina officials followed a similar course in response to the Fourth 
Circuit invalidating Virginia’s ban when a local official stated his intent to 
issue licenses to same-sex couples.58 
Even on this strategic move, however, Alabama posed an additional 
wrinkle. Because Attorney General Strange was enjoined from enforcing 
the same-sex marriage ban, he did not litigate the mandamus petition. 
Instead, two private organizations petitioned as relators of the State. 
In a 134-page per curiam opinion, six justices (with Chief Justice 
Moore not participating and two justices dissenting) held that Alabama’s 
same-sex marriage ban was constitutionally valid and must be enforced, 
rejecting concerns about the organizations’ standing, questions about the 
court’s own jurisdiction, Judge Granade’s contrary decisions, contrary 
precedent from multiple lower federal courts, and repeated signals from the 
Supreme Court of the United States.59 The result was statewide uniformity 
going forward—no same-sex couples could obtain marriage licenses, at 
least without a new federal court order. But the four couples granted 
licenses under the Strawser injunction remained married, as did couples 
granted licenses by other probate judges voluntarily complying with the 
district court precedent. 
This decision generated the strongest denunciations of state–federal 
stalemates60 and accusations of defiance and rebellion by the state supreme 
 
55  Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *43 (Ala. Mar. 3, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/4CBZ-G83T]. 
56  Kansas ex rel. Schmidt v. Moriarty, No. 112,590, slip op. at 2 (Kan. Oct. 10, 2014), available at 
http://www.kscourts.org/State_v_Moriarty/112590.pdf [http://perma.cc/PW3E-3R5X]. 
57  Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-02518-DDC/TTJ, 2014 WL 5598128 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2014) 
[https://perma.cc/8KET-DFCE]. 
58  Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 580 (D. S.C. 2014) [http://perma.cc/3BWJ-HTNP]; South 
Carolina ex rel. Wilson v. Condon, 764 S.E.2d 247, 248 (S.C. 2014) [http://perma.cc/ZB95-2JHK]. 
59  Ex parte Alabama, 2015 WL 892752, at *25, *43; but see Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940, 941 
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay) (criticizing Court’s “acquiescence” in 
lower court decisions invalidating state bans as an inappropriate “signal of the Court’s intended 
resolution of that question”). 
60  Ed Brayton, AL Supreme Court Sets Up Big Showdown with Fed. Courts, FREETHOUGHTBLOGS 
(Mar. 4, 2015), http://freethoughtblogs.com/dispatches/2015/03/04/al-supreme-court-sets-up-big-
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court and by Moore in particular,61 even though Moore did not participate in 
the mandamus action. Again, however, a proper focus on the judicial 
process shows that the state court did not “defy” federal courts or federal 
law. 
The court obviously disagreed with Judge Granade, as well as with the 
weight of federal appellate and trial courts, on the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But interpretations of federal law by lower federal 
courts do not bind state courts.62 State courts considering federal law issues 
function as inferior federal tribunals; they are vested with the same 
interpretive leeway on the meaning of federal law as any lower federal 
court, are bound only by superior Supreme Court precedent, and are subject 
only to Supreme Court review.63 A federal district court in a state and a state 
supreme court can diverge on a constitutional question, just as two federal 
district courts (even within the same state) can diverge; one court is not 
precluded from reaching a different decision than the other64 and one court’s 
decision is not entitled to greater deference simply because it came first. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama thus acted entirely within its unquestioned 
power in reaching a different constitutional conclusion than did the federal 
district court. One might disagree with the merits of that decision.65 But 
disagreement with a state court decision on a question of federal law does 
not render that decision illegitimate, any more than disagreement with 
Judge Granade renders her decisions illegitimate. Nor do divergent results 
mean that one court has rebelled against the other. 
The real effect of the mandamus was practical rather than legal. The 
order stripped probate judges of the option, which many had taken, of 
voluntarily following Judge Granade’s decision and issuing licenses to 
same-sex couples without awaiting a new lawsuit and injunction. But it also 
permitted any probate judge subject to a federal injunction to be released 
from the mandamus.66 In fact, Judge Granade and the Supreme Court of 
Alabama agreed on the initial relationship between their respective orders. 
The state court declined to release Judge Davis from the mandamus, 
concluding that he already had satisfied the federal injunction by issuing 
licenses to the four Strawser couples and was not under a continuing federal 
 
showdown-with-fed-courts [http://perma.cc/69F9-8M75]. 
61  See, e.g., Lamparello, supra note 16; Krotoszynski, supra note 13. 
62  See generally Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal 
Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53 (2015) [http://perma.cc/8BDU-
VZB8]; Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts Disagree on 
Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2014) [http://perma.cc/U99U-939D]. 
63  James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of 
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 234 (2007) [http://perma.cc/VD73-YD8P]. 
64  Fallon, supra note 44, at 1340. 
65  See generally Lamparello, supra note 16. 
66  Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *42 (Ala. Mar. 3, 
2015). 
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obligation to issue licenses to anyone else.67 Judge Granade declined to stay 
her injunction against Davis for the same reason—having performed as to 
the named plaintiffs, Davis faced no conflicting federal and state 
obligations.68 
The state mandamus prompted a new federal procedural counter. In 
May, Judge Granade certified Strawser as an injunctive class action.69 The 
plaintiff class was defined as 
All persons in Alabama who wish to obtain a marriage license in order to marry 
a person of the same sex and to have the marriage recognized under Alabama 
law, and who are unable to do so because of the enforcement of Alabama’s 
laws prohibiting the issuance of marriage licenses to same sex couples and 
barring recognition of their marriages.70 
The defendant class was defined as “All Alabama county probate 
judges who are enforcing or in the future may enforce Alabama’s laws 
barring the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and refusing 
to recognize their marriages.”71 In a separate order, Judge Granade extended 
the preliminary injunction, previously entered against Davis in favor of four 
couples, to prohibit the defendant class from enforcing the state’s same-sex 
marriage ban and requiring them to issue marriage licenses to any member 
of the plaintiff class who followed the proper steps towards obtaining a 
license. This injunction required every Alabama probate judge to issue 
licenses to any same-sex couples in Alabama who requested one, with 
every judge subject to contempt for noncompliance. Recognizing the 
“imminent” resolution of Obergefell, however, Judge Granade stayed the 
class injunction “until the Supreme Court issues its ruling” on the 
constitutional question.72 
The class injunction did set up a potential conflict with the state 
mandamus. But Judge Granade insisted this did not provide a basis for not 
extending the injunction to the class. She explained that the choice for the 
probate judges—comply with the state order by not issuing licenses or 
comply with the federal order by issuing licenses—“should be simple” in 
light of the Supremacy Clause and the way in which it empowers federal 
courts to declare state laws invalid.73 No probate judge could be held liable 
 
67  Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 1036064, at *1 (Ala. Mar. 10, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/22MD-2ZFC]. 
68  Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 1186326, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/HM57-USMD]. 
69  Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2) (establishing standards for class certification). 
70  Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449251, at *1 (S.D. Ala. May 21, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/N37Y-J9S7]. 
71  Id. 
72  Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449468, at *1, *6 (S.D. Ala. May 21, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/ACA8-95N2]. 
73  Id. at *4. 
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for violating Alabama law by engaging in conduct required by the 
Constitution—issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.74 
While the conclusion was correct, this reasoning misunderstood the 
conflict at issue. Judge Granade accurately described the role of the 
Supremacy Clause in a collision between a state law and a federal 
injunction applying the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent enforcement of 
that state law. The conflict here, however, was between two judicial 
decisions and orders—one state, one federal—measuring the validity of a 
state law under competing interpretations of the federal Constitution. The 
Supremacy Clause does not grant greater force to an order from a lower 
federal court than to an order from a state court. Judge Granade’s 
declaration that the Fourteenth Amendment required defendants to issue 
licenses did not trump the state Supreme Court’s declaration that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not require issuance of those licenses or that 
state law could prohibit their issuance. Again, a conflict between a lower 
federal court and a state supreme court stands on the same footing as a 
conflict between two lower federal courts. 
The better justification for rejecting the defendants’ argument was that 
any potential conflict between the two orders did not compel the federal 
court to stay its hand. First, as Judge Granade pointed out, Strawser was 
filed and the original injunction entered before the state mandamus issued.75 
Second, the competing orders were unlikely to ripen into a genuine federal-
state conflict, because the state mandamus by its terms allowed probate 
judges facing a competing federal injunction to seek and obtain release 
from the mandamus.76 Class certification simply expanded the universe of 
probate judges subject to the direct force of the federal injunction, thereby 
expanding the universe of probate judges eligible to seek release from the 
mandamus—from Judge Davis to every probate judge in the state. A 
conflict or stalemate thus would arise only if the Supreme Court of 
Alabama refused to grant the release and continued to enforce the 
mandamus even against probate judges subject to the class injunction. But 
the state court gave no indication that it intended to provoke such a direct 
and open confrontation with a federal court. In any event, by staying the 
class injunction pending Obergefell, Judge Granade preempted even that 
possible conflict.  
 
CONCLUSION: ALABAMA AFTER OBERGEFELL 
Obergefell largely rendered Alabama’s final stand against marriage 
equality a historical footnote. Although the Supreme Court did not speak 
directly to Alabama law or directly enjoin Alabama officials, the decision 
 
74  Id. at *5. 
75  Id. at *4. 
76  Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *43 (Ala. Mar. 3, 
2015). 
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served as binding precedent on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
And the decision quickly moved Alabama officials to resolve litigation over 
that state’s ban. 
Alabama Governor Robert Bentley and Attorney General Strange both 
expressed profound disagreement with the decision, but pledged that they 
would uphold the law of the land, which now included a right for same-sex 
couples to marry on equal terms.77 The Strawser plaintiffs argued that the 
stay of the class injunction, imposed “until the Supreme Court issues its 
ruling,”78 lifted as soon as Obergefell issued; the injunction thus became 
immediately effective without further order from the court, enforceable 
through contempt proceedings against any probate judge who declined to 
issue licenses to same-sex couples.79 The Association of County 
Commissions recommended that probate judges begin issuing marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples in the same manner and according to the same 
requirements as opposite-sex couples.80 And Judge Granade quickly agreed 
in a July 1 clarifying order, stating “by the language set forth in the order, 
the preliminary injunction is now in effect and binding on all members of 
the Defendant Class.”81 Probate judges in many parts of the state, including 
Judge Davis in Mobile, began issuing licenses the day of the ruling.82 
Especially given the Supreme Court-dictated conclusion, everything 
that happened in Alabama in the months prior to Obergefell arguably 
wasted time, effort, and thousands of taxpayer dollars, forcing couples to 
bring additional federal lawsuits seeking discrete injunctions against 
individual probate judges or to litigate ancillary non-merits issues such as 
class certification. And the state Supreme Court’s mandamus arguably 
represented a “quixotic” attempt by state officials and advocacy groups to 
 
77  Arian Campo-Flores, Alabama Probate Judges Begin Issuing Licenses for Same-Sex Marriages, 
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81  Strawser v. Strange, No 14-0424-CG-C (S.D. Ala. July 1, 2015), available at 
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stop the inevitable,83 which finally arrived in Obergefell. 
Of course, Obergefell did not settle the issue for everyone. The 
Supreme Court of Alabama reminded probate judges that the parties in 
Obergefell had twenty-five days to seek reconsideration in the Supreme 
Court of the United States and ordered further briefing on the new 
precedent’s effect on the state mandamus.84 Initially, several counties 
declined to issue licenses to same-sex couples, others ceased issuing 
licenses at all, and others insisted on waiting for the Supreme Court’s 
mandate to issue,85 although those practices ended following Judge 
Granade’s July 1 order clarifying that all probate judges statewide were 
bound by an effective injunction. 
And, as expected, Moore was the most vocal in opposition. Off the 
bench, he argued that Obergefell was worse than Plessy v. Ferguson86 and 
Supreme Court decisions about slavery,87 and warned that the decision 
would lead to persecution of Christians,88 although he did not renew his 
previous promises to defy any pro-marriage-equality decision.89 Moore’s 
responses might suggest that he was as motivated by anti-LGBTQ animus 
as George Wallace was by anti-African-American and anti-integration 
animus.90 At the very least, Moore insisted, Obergefell did not take effect 
until the twenty-five day period for seeking reconsideration had expired;91 
he first argued that probate judges were prohibited from issuing licenses in 
that time period, then revised his position to insist only that they were not 
required to do so.92 Of course, both positions failed because both ignored 
the immediate lifting of the stay of the Strawser injunction—it was that 
order, not the Court’s broad constitutional statements in Obergefell, that 
actually controlled Alabama officials as to Alabama law and compelled 
them to issue licenses to same-sex couples. 
The point, however, is that between January 2015 and June 26, 2015, 
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Alabama officials were legally obligated to issue marriage licenses to four 
same-sex couples. Beyond that, they were not legally obligated to adhere to 
merely persuasive authority. They were not obligated by court orders in 
actions to which they were not party or as to people who were not parties, 
simply to preserve efficiency for civil rights plaintiffs or public perceptions 
of the judiciary. And the Supreme Court of Alabama, like any lower federal 
tribunal, was not bound to follow precedent from a coordinate federal 
district court. There was no “defiance” in Alabama, only an insistence on 
procedural regularity, which Obergefell ultimately provided and with which 
most public officials appeared ready to comply.  
More importantly, because marriage equality will not be the last civil 
rights battle fought in the federal judiciary, it is essential that courts, parties, 
attorneys, commentators, and the public account for and understand how 
procedural mechanisms affect constitutional litigation and constitutional 
change. While the controversy over marriage equality in Alabama shared 
the unfortunate rhetoric of past controversies over integration, comparing 
the demand for procedural regularity with George Wallace’s grandstanding 
refusal to comply with an explicit injunction is ill-advised, legally 
erroneous, historically inaccurate, and dismissive of the significance of 
formal judicial processes. 
 
 
